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In this paper we analyse the effect of news relating to the expected path of 
monetary policy on interest rate futures. Central banks’ transparency is in most 
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communication needs to be included as a potential source of news. We therefore 
consider four types of news: macroeconomic news, overseas news, monetary 
policy surprises and central bank communication. The effect of these types of news 
on daily changes in interest rate futures is estimated using an EGARCH model for 
a panel of six economies. We find that interest rate expectations respond to both 
macroeconomic and policy news, although the response to macroeconomic news is 
larger, especially once we include foreign news. Overall, the results suggest that 
the impact of the RBA’s communication policy is in line with other major central 
banks, and significantly influences (and informs) expectations of future monetary 
policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
Central banks around the world have become considerably more transparent over 
the past decade. An important part of this has been the increased efforts by central 
banks to communicate their views about the economic outlook and its implications 
for monetary policy. On an abstract level, if a central bank was operating a fully 
transparent monetary policy rule, market participants would only require 
macroeconomic news to anticipate future changes in monetary policy. However, in 
practice, policy-makers must deal with uncertainty and structural change, which 
requires them to use some discretion in formulating policy. No policy framework 
can specify how the policy-maker should respond to every possible contingency. 
Therefore, there is a role for central banks to regularly articulate their thinking to 
help market participants filter macroeconomic news. 
 There is a substantial body of academic work on the theoretical and empirical 
aspects of monetary policy transparency. In a recent study, Coppel and 
Connolly (2003) found that the predictability of monetary policy is very similar 
across a panel of central banks in developed economies, possibly reflecting 
similarities in central bank communication strategies. Our study expands their 
results by asking which channels of communication influence expectations of 
future policy. One approach to address this question is to examine empirically the 
effect of different channels of central bank communication on financial market 
expectations of future interest rates. Of course, the impact of monetary policy 
communication has to be judged in the light of other news events, which can have 
a much larger effect on the market, such as international developments, domestic 
macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy decisions themselves. In this 
paper we therefore estimate the impact of four types of news on interest rate 
expectations: domestic macroeconomic news, foreign news, monetary policy 
surprises and central bank communication.   2
The effect of macroeconomic news and policy decisions on interest rate 
expectations has been the subject of a number of event studies that investigate what 
moves interest rate futures, in which interest rate expectations are embedded. The 
widely used approach in this literature is to estimate the daily change in interest 
rate futures as a function of macroeconomic and policy surprises. However, it is 
more difficult to measure the impact of monetary policy communication on interest 
rate futures. The main reason is the difficulty of quantifying the information 
content of, for example, a speech in a one-dimensional measure. It is even 
sometimes difficult to establish the direction in which a certain communication 
event should influence interest rate expectations. One way of measuring the impact 
of policy news, irrespective of the direction of movement, is to examine its effect 
on the variance of interest rate futures on the day. Both elements – the effect of 
macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises on the change in interest rate 
futures and the effect of central bank communication on the variance of interest 
rate futures – are combined in the GARCH-type model applied in this paper. 
A few papers have empirically examined this issue for individual economies, such 
as a recent study for the United States by Kohn and Sack (2003), and for Australia 
by Campbell and Lewis (1998). In this paper we apply a framework similar to that 
suggested by Kohn and Sack to a panel of economies (Australia, Canada, the 
euro area, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States), which allows 
us to compare central bank communication channels across different institutional 
frameworks. 
Our results suggest that central bank communication is not a large contributor to 
overall movements in interest rate futures. We find that the important channels of 
communication add only a few basis points to the standard deviation of rates on 
the days on which these communication events occur, which is a small minority 
of trading days. In comparison, across all trading days, the standard deviation of 
daily changes in the futures rates averages around 6 basis points for our panel of 
economies. Domestic and foreign macroeconomic news events that we examine 
occur on a majority of trading days and make a much larger contribution to the 
variance of changes in interest rate futures. This pattern holds across all 
economies. 
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While the effects of central bank communication are generally small, we find that 
they increase the standard deviation of interest rates on the day on which the 
communication occurs, as a result of providing new information to the markets. 
Among the different types of communication, commentaries following rate 
decisions, monetary policy reports and parliamentary hearings are found to have 
the greatest influence on expectations for future policy in the economies examined. 
Speeches, on the other hand, have typically much less of an impact. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews some 
conceptual considerations on how news affects interest rate expectations of 
financial markets. Section 3 discusses the data and some preliminary empirical 
evidence of the link between news and interest rate futures, followed by the 
estimation of a full-scale model in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  News and Interest Rate Expectations: Some Conceptual Issues 
Many asset prices incorporate, among other factors, expectations about the future 
path of monetary policy. The most direct measure of expected future policy rates 
are interest rate futures, since these incorporate expectations of market interest 
rates, which are closely linked to the policy rate over the short to medium horizon. 
Over this horizon, movements in interest rate futures mainly reflect revisions in 
market expectations regarding the future path of monetary policy.1 
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that interest rate futures incorporate all 
relevant information about future interest rates that is available at any point in 
time. As a consequence, a variable that can be forecast perfectly will have no 
                                           
1  In principle, a change in interest rate expectations can reflect two different channels: revisions 
of expectations about monetary policy settings, or revisions of expectations about the 
monetary policy framework, which in turn affects expectations about long-run inflation. We 
would expect the former to affect interest rate futures at the short to medium end of the yield 
curve, while the latter is more relevant for expectations of longer-term nominal interest rates. 
In this paper, we concentrate on the short- to medium-term expectations of interest rates, and, 
therefore, on news that is relevant for an assessment of monetary policy conditions over that 
period. 
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measurable effect on changes in interest rate futures. This, however, does not mean 
that the variable is unimportant for monetary policy setting, but it means that 
expectations will not significantly change following the release of news on such a 
variable. As a result, the literature on the movement of financial markets in 
response to news releases usually focuses on the surprise element in the data (see, 
for example, Fleming and Remolona 1997). 
Potentially, any type of news event that can convey information on the future path 
of monetary policy can affect interest rate expectations. For example, the yield 
curve should be influenced by both policy-related events such as meetings of the 
committee or board that sets policy rates and by the release of macroeconomic 
news. Central bank communication more generally can provide new information to 
the extent that it helps the markets to interpret the relevance of macroeconomic 
developments for the decision-making process. Consequently, in this paper we 
look at four types of news: 
•  domestic macroeconomic news, comprising domestic macroeconomic data 
releases; 
•  foreign news, comprising data releases and policy decisions in important 
international markets; 
•  monetary policy news, that is (domestic) monetary policy decisions; and 
•  central bank communication, including regular reports, parliamentary 
hearings, press releases, minutes of meetings and speeches. 
Estimating the effect of macroeconomic news on interest rates is relatively 
straightforward. The widely used approach in the event-study literature is to 
estimate the daily change in the interest rate futures as a function of 
macroeconomic surprises (see, for example, Jansen and de Haan 2003, and 
Kohn and Sack 2003). The surprise element is measured by taking the difference 
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between the actual outcome of macroeconomic news releases and the outcome 
expected in a survey of market economists.2 
Developments in important foreign markets, especially the US, appear to have a 
major impact on all asset classes in other economies. Consequently, in a number of 
studies foreign news has been identified as an important determinant of domestic 
interest rate futures. Some of these studies account for foreign news by explicitly 
considering the effect on domestic interest rate futures of foreign policy decisions 
and a number of selected foreign data releases (see, for example, Campbell and 
Lewis 1998, and Gravelle and Moessner 2001). Others have modelled domestic 
and foreign interest rate futures jointly, thus accounting for linkages between 
economies (for example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2002, and Kim and Sheen 2000). 
In this paper, we assume that any important development in the foreign market 
must be reflected in a change of the foreign interest rate futures. These changes in 
foreign interest rate futures can therefore be seen as a proxy for both foreign 
macroeconomic data releases and foreign policy surprises. 
Estimating the effect of monetary policy surprises on interest rates has been the 
subject of numerous studies on the predictability of monetary policy (see, for 
example, Bomfim and Reinhart 2000, Haldane and Read 2000, Kuttner 2001, 
Lange, Sack and Whitesell 2001, Muller and Zelmer 1999, and Ross 2002). In 
these studies, monetary policy surprises are typically defined as the change in the 
30-day interest rate on the day of announcement, which is shown to be very closely 
related to the change in the expected policy rate over the following month. In a 
recent study, Coppel and Connolly (2003) compare the predictability of monetary 
policy across a panel of central banks. Table 1 replicates their results, updated to 
June 2004, the endpoint of the dataset used in our study. The coefficients reported 
measure the response of the 30-day interest rate to monetary policy moves. A 
                                           
2  Many financial time-series studies use tick-by-tick data to examine the impact of a specific 
event, instead of daily data. This has the advantage of being able to more easily identify the 
source of interest rate movements if more than one news event occurs on the day. However, 
this was difficult in our study for several reasons. First, a number of our communication 
variables, such as parliamentary hearings or speeches, have no specific time when the 
information content is released. Second, interest rate futures markets are not always liquid 
enough to examine tick-by-tick data. Finally, given the scope of our dataset, with a large 
number of news releases across six economies, establishing the exact timing of all data 
releases and communication events was not feasible. 
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coefficient of zero implies that monetary policy is, on average, fully predictable, 
and there are no policy surprises. A non-zero coefficient measures the size of the 
surprise element per basis point increase in the policy rate, on average. 
Table 1: Market Response to Monetary Policy Moves 
Same-day change in 30-day interest rates, January 1999–June 2004 
 Australia  Canada  Euro  area  NZ  UK  US 














Notes:  Updated results from Table 2, Coppel and Connolly (2003). The coefficients are based on a regression of
the daily change in the 30-day interest rate on the changes in the policy rate. Numbers in brackets are the
standard deviations. *** and * denote coefficients that are significant at the 1 and 10 per cent level,
respectively. 
 
The results confirm Coppel and Connolly’s conclusion: the predictability of 
monetary policy is very similar across these central banks. This suggests that, 
despite differences in the communication framework, central banks in these 
economies convey information to financial markets to a very similar degree. Our 
study expands on these results by looking in more detail at the different 
communication channels that influence financial markets’ expectations of future 
monetary policy. 
Estimating the effect of central bank communication on expectations of monetary 
policy has been the subject of only a few studies. While there is a substantial body 
of theoretical literature (for recent reviews of the literature, see Geraats 2002 and 
Hahn 2002), the empirical literature on this topic is relatively recent, partly 
because it is difficult to measure the impact of monetary policy communication on 
interest rate expectations. To determine the effect of communication on interest 
rate futures directly would require a measure that can summarise and quantify the 
information contained in a communication event. However, sometimes it might 
even be difficult to establish the direction in which a certain communication event 
should influence interest rate expectations. One way of measuring the impact of 
policy news, irrespective of the direction of movement, is to examine the variance 
of interest rate futures on the day, since any change in the mean will also affect the 
variance on the same day. A specific type of communication can then be associated 
with a dummy variable that can take the value of one on days where such a 
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communication event happens and zero otherwise.3 This approach is consistent 
with Kohn and Sack (2003), who look at the effect of communication on 
expectations in the US, Chadha and Nolan (2001) who examine the UK, and 
Campbell and Lewis (1998) who include an ‘RBA commentary’ variable in their 
study of changes in Australian interest rate futures. 
An interesting question is whether increased variance on the day of central bank 
communication should be viewed as good or bad. While Chadha and Nolan 
characterise higher variance as bad, Kohn and Sack assume that increased variance 
is evidence that central bank communication conveys important information to 
market participants. We take the view that if central bank communication is to 
have any influence on expectations, this must show up as an increase in the daily 
standard deviation on days of communication. However, it is possible for some 
communication to be poorly worded or misinterpreted, which could be viewed as 
causing unnecessary volatility in financial markets. Therefore, since we cannot 
compare the intention of the central bank with the markets’ reaction to the 
communication, we are only measuring whether a channel of communication has 
the effect of providing information to market participants, irrespective of whether 
that information is necessary or accurate. 
Our study shares a number of features with earlier studies that estimate the effect 
on interest rate expectations of different types of news relevant to the future path of 
monetary policy. We examine daily changes in interest rate futures, though 
concentrate on the futures one to eight quarters ahead (Campbell and Lewis 1998 
and Fleming and Remolona 1997 also analyse the long end of the yield curve). 
Similar to Kohn and Sack (2003) and Chadha and Nolan (2001), we estimate a 
model that allows us to judge the effect on both the mean and the standard 
deviation of the daily changes in expected interest rates. Unlike these studies, 
however, we estimate our results across a panel of economies. This may allow us 
                                           
3  Alternatively, some studies, such as Jansen and de Haan (2003) and Andersson, Dillén and 
Sellin (2001), address this problem by reading each communication and making a subjective 
determination of whether it should have a positive or negative effect. However, it is likely to 
be difficult to make a judgement on the ‘intention’ of a speech on a consistent basis, 
especially in a cross-country study such as ours. Moreover, some communication events such 
as speeches can include a question and answer session, which may convey important 
information. Unfortunately, transcripts of such sessions are usually not available on central 
banks’ websites. 
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to gain some insight into whether different types of central bank communication 
convey information ‘universally’. 
3.  Does News Matter? 
As outlined in the previous section, in this paper we model the various influences – 
domestic and foreign – on interest rate expectations in six different economies. We 
concentrate on influences that change expectations for the future path of monetary 
policy: domestic macroeconomic data surprises, changes in foreign news reflected 
in changes in foreign interest rate futures, domestic monetary policy surprises and 
central bank communication. The next section summarises the data underlying our 
analysis, followed by a preliminary analysis. This analysis investigates the 
contribution of surprises in the four news categories to daily changes in interest 
rate futures, before a formal model of the effect of individual news events is 
estimated in Section 4. 
3.1  Data 
At the core of our empirical analysis are changes in interest rate expectations. We 
measure these using changes in daily implied interest rates from 90-day interest 
rate futures, ∆ft , at maturities from one to eight quarters, based on the last trade 
available for each day. Our data for individual economies start in January 1997 for 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and in 1999 for the 
euro area and New Zealand.4 Our panel results therefore start in 1999. The last data 
point included is 17 June 2004. 
Domestic macroeconomic surprises, newsb,t, related to a release of data on b (for 
example, GDP, CPI or employment releases), are measured by taking the 
difference between the actual outcome of data released and the outcome expected 
in a survey of market economists. Consulting Bloomberg yielded a large number of 
                                           
4  A number of the news releases and market expectations were readily available only since 
1997. Moreover, by then all inflation targeters included in the samples had put in place most 
elements of their current communication frameworks. The Bank of Canada changed elements 
of their communication strategy up until December 2000 (see, for example, Siklos 2003), but 
our results for Canada were qualitatively unchanged when estimated over the shorter time 
period starting in 2001. 
   9
surveys of expected macroeconomic news outcomes for constructing surprise 
variables (Table 2). 
Table 2: Number of Observations 
1 January 1997–17 June 2004 
 Australia  Canada  Euro  area  NZ  UK  US  Panel 
Observations  1 947  1 947  1 425  1 372  1 947  1 947  8 550 
Policy decisions    84    45    100    44    92    63    357 
News releases    801    1 384    3 246    354    1 731    3 857    9 804 
Release  variables   16   24   74   16   26   61    217 
Notes:  The data for the euro area start on 1 January 1999 and for NZ start on 17 March 1999; the panel includes
data for all six economies from 1 January 1999. 
 
Foreign news surprises can be approximated by the contemporaneous change in the 
interest rate futures of equivalent maturity in an important foreign market, ∆ft
OS, 
and its lags. These should capture both the macroeconomic surprises for these 
foreign economies and monetary policy surprises. A number of studies have found 
that developments in US financial markets have an important effect on other 
economies’ financial markets. We therefore include changes in US interest rate 
futures in the equations for all other economies, and also changes in Australian 
interest rate futures in the model for New Zealand.5 
Monetary policy surprises, pst, are measured by taking the change in 30-day 
interest rates on the day of monetary policy decisions, consistent with 
Campbell and Lewis (1998) and Kohn and Sack (2003). This 30-day interest rate, a 
market interest rate, should reflect market participants’ expectation of the actual 
policy rate for the following month. Since central banks in our sample have regular 
policy meetings in a monthly or 6-weekly cycle, the expected policy rate should be 
very similar, if not the same, over this month. Consequently, any change of the 
30-day interest rate can be attributed to a change in the (expected) policy rate 
which is set on the first day of the 30-day paper. 
                                           
5  Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) find that US developments seem to be more important for 
euro interest rates than vice versa. They argue that one reason for this may be that US data are 
typically released earlier than euro area data, and thus might provide a leading indicator 
function. For our sample of economies, US macroeconomic data are typically released earlier 
than domestic data in a similar category. 
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The information or news content of central bank communication cannot be 
collapsed into one empirical measure, making it difficult to measure the surprise 
element or even the direction. Therefore, we measure different types of 
communication, w, by the central bank through a communication dummy, comw,t, 
that takes the value one if a certain communication event has happened on a day, 
and zero otherwise. These communication events include policy rate decisions with 
and without commentary, monetary policy reports, parliamentary hearings, minutes 
of meetings (and voting records) and speeches. The data were available on the 
websites of the six central banks. 
A number of variables control for time-specific and other events, Otherd,t, where d 
denotes the different variables. These include four dummies for day-of-the-week 
effects,  Other1-4,t, a dummy for public holidays, Other5,t, and a dummy for 
11 September 2001, Other6,t.6 We also include a measure for the days to rollover 
for each futures contract, Other7,t. Every three months on a pre-set date, the 1
st 
futures contract is settled and the remaining futures contracts are rolled over to the 
next contract. Since volatility may be expected to vary as a contract approaches 
expiry, we include this variable to capture this effect. 
3.2  A Preliminary Analysis 
In Section 2 we have noted a number of theoretical reasons why macroeconomic 
and monetary policy news should affect interest rate expectations. However, many 
other factors can affect the variance of daily financial data. One simple way to 
assess whether different types of news affect interest rate expectations is, therefore, 
to ask whether interest rate futures have a higher variance on days of news releases 
than on other days. 
Table 3 is based on the 100 largest daily changes in interest rate futures for each of 
the six economies in our study. For illustrative purposes, we only present the 
results for the 4
th futures contract in the tables, which measures expectations for 
one year in the future, roughly the middle of the horizon of our futures data. For 
                                           
6  Day-of-the-week effects can be expected to proxy for news events that we have omitted from 
our study. Since releases of a specific category of news are often scheduled for the same day 
of the week, this can show up as additional variance on that weekday. 
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each economy the first column shows the proportion of the top 100 daily changes 
that fall on days with foreign market movements, macroeconomic data surprises, 
monetary policy surprises and central bank communication. The second column 
shows the corresponding proportion of news days in the entire sample, which – 
except for the euro area and New Zealand – comprises 1 947 observations. If 
economic announcements or monetary policy news did not affect markets, the 
proportion of large changes in interest rate futures occurring on news days should 
not be significantly different to the proportion of news days in the entire sample. 
Table 3: 100 Largest Changes in Interest Rate Futures 
4
th contract, 1 January 1997–17 June 2004, 
Proportion of days – per cent 
  Australia   Canada  Euro  area
(a) NZ
(a) UK    US 
 Top 
100 














57 24    72 24 49 27  80 27  47 24    –  – 
Macro news 
surprises 
38 29    50 45 77 79  25 16  43 38    86 72 




10    6     5    5    24  28    6    4  20  15     29  25 
Other  days  13 49    10 40    5 12   3 59  18 39     9 22 
Notes:  (a) The data for the euro area start on 1 January 1999 and for NZ on 17 March 1999. 
  (b) Foreign interest rate futures move almost on a daily basis. For this analysis we therefore concentrate 
on ‘large’ or ‘important’ moves which we define to be any moves that are larger than one standard
deviation of the series over the entire sample period. 
  (c) ‘Other communication’ excludes any communication released jointly with a policy decision. 
 
We can make two observations from these results. First, all four news categories 
are over-represented on the days with the largest 100 changes in interest rate 
futures, compared with their overall share in the sample. Second, most of the days 
with large changes are also days when foreign interest futures changed 
significantly or when domestic macroeconomic data surprises occurred. However, 
the methodology used in Table 3 has an obvious drawback. Different types of news 
can arrive on the same day, and therefore changes in interest rate expectations
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can be attributable to either or both. In fact, in large economies such as the 
United States, barely a day passes without the release of new data. To disentangle 
– and possibly quantify – the effect of different news, an econometric model needs 
to be estimated. In the remainder of this section we estimate two very simple 
equations with the aim of disentangling the contributions of the different news 
categories. 
The simple model of Equation (1) explains the change in 90-day interest rate 
futures ∆ft with a range of factors, such as monetary policy surprises pst, domestic 
macroeconomic data surprises newsb,t, foreign data surprises ∆f 
OS, and different 
types of communication by the central bank comw,t . As mentioned above, a number 
of variables, Otherd,t , control for time-specific events. We also include lags of 
futures rates to control for autoregressive behaviour in the futures markets. 












t b b t
j
a














From this model the relative contributions of the different types of news in 
explaining changes in interest rate expectations can be calculated based on an 
ANOVA analysis.7 Columns (1) in Table 4 show the results for each economy. An 
initial observation is that the unexplained residual is by far the largest component. 
This means that a large share of the variation in daily interest rate futures cannot be 
explained by simple regression on unexpected macroeconomic and monetary 
policy news, domestic or foreign. However, some conclusions can be drawn from 
the part that can be explained by the model. The pattern for Australia is illustrative  
                                           
7  The contributions based on an ANOVA analysis can be thought of as the differences in 
(unadjusted) R-squared from a regression with and without the variable (or set of variables) in 
question. Since this measures only the marginal contribution of this variable, the order in 
which the contributions are calculated can matter if the variable is correlated with the 
variables already contained in the model. In our model, we have included the communication 
variable last, thereby assuming that any change in interest rate futures that could be attributed 
to either communication or another news event, is attributed to the latter. While this might 
explain the low contribution of communication in all regressions, an ordering in which 
communication was included first, yielded similar results, with a contribution from 




Table 4: Contributions of Different Types of News – ANOVA Results 
4
th contract, 1 January 1997–17 June 2004 
Per cent of total variation in daily interest rate futures 
        Australia Canada Euro  area
(a) NZ
(a)      UK US
(1)
(b) (2)
(c) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Explained                          35.9 22.4 62.4 46.6 44.2 26.2 55.8 44.8 31.3 18.4 18.1 22.9
Due to news from:                 
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                         
 Foreign  market 
 movements 
27.8 11.8 52.8 33.4 36.3 14.3 48.0 28.0 20.3 6.8 – –
 Unexpected 
 macroeconomic  news 
4.6 2.1 3.1 1.4 4.5 4.1 1.9 1.3 6.6 3.3 16.6 10.5
 Monetary  policy 
 surprises 
2.1 2.0 5.0 4.4 0.6 0.8 2.7 3.8 2.9 2.9 0.1 0.5
 Central  bank 
 communication 
0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.3 0.5 3.9 0.1 0.7 0.5 2.9
 Other  variables  1.1 6.1 1.2 7.2 1.5 5.7 2.7 7.8 1.4 4.7 0.9 9.0
Unexplained  residual 64.1 77.6 37.6 53.4 55.8 73.8 44.2 55.2 68.7 81.6 81.9 77.1
Notes:  (a) ANOVA contributions are marginal contributions, that is, they depend on the ordering. Alternative orderings, however, did not materially affect these
results. Data for the euro area start on 1 January 1999 and for NZ start on 17 March 1999. 
  (b) Based on Equation (1), a regression of changes in interest rate futures on news in the four categories and some time-specific controls. 
  (c) Based on Equation (2), which uses absolute values for the model estimated in Equation (1). 
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for all economies: foreign market movements8 and domestic macroeconomic news 
are the largest source of variation. Their effect is prominent for interest rate futures 
over the entire time horizon considered (Table 4 contains only the results for the 
4
th contract, but the results for all contracts are consistent with those in Section 4.2 
and are available from the authors). In contrast, monetary policy surprises appear 
to affect interest rate expectations mainly in the very short term. 
Finally, communication by the central bank explains changes in interest rate 
expectations only to a small degree. This might suggest that central bank 
communication provides some information to markets, but interest rate 
expectations mostly get revised after macroeconomic data surprises or unexpected 
monetary policy decisions. This conclusion is, however, partly complicated by our 
measure of communication events as a dummy. As it is difficult to quantify the 
information contained in central bank communication, we have identified each 
type of communication event only by whether or not it happens on a specific day. 
The estimated coefficient underlying the ANOVA analysis in Table 4, on the other 
hand, measures the average impact of all communication events of a specific type. 
If this type of communication has, on average, equally often ‘upward’ and 
‘downward’ impacts, we would expect to estimate a zero impact of a 
communication dummy in this analysis. 
An alternative is to estimate a model that uses absolute values only, such as 
Campbell and Lewis (1998). Taking absolute values of the impact would avoid the 
‘averaging out’ of upward and downward impacts. We consequently estimated 
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8  Foreign market movements are modelled for all economies, except for the US, as changes in 
US interest rate futures. For New Zealand, changes in Australian interest rate futures are also 
included. 
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Columns (2) in Table 4 show the ANOVA contributions from this regression. The 
results confirm our earlier findings: domestic macroeconomic news and especially 
foreign market movements explain a much larger share of changes in interest rate 
futures than monetary policy surprises and central bank communication. The 
contribution of central bank communication remains relatively low, suggesting that 
the ‘averaging’ effect is not very strong. However, compared with the results for 
Equation (1) the contribution of foreign market movements is much lower, which 
may be due to the loss of information in the absolute value equation (as indicated 
by the lower R-squared of Equation (2)). Many foreign market movements happen 
on the same day as monetary policy decisions or macroeconomic news. The 
econometric estimation has difficulties attributing these correctly as we have given 
up the information on ‘direction’ of all news variables. 
Taken together, these results indicate that movements in foreign markets and 
domestic macroeconomic data surprises affect interest rate expectations to a much 
larger degree than central bank communication. Of course, the latter can still affect 
the standard deviation of the interest rate futures on the day of the communication 
event. Due to the nature of the communication variables (neither direction nor 
strength is modelled) compared with the other ‘news variables’, a different 
approach is needed to assess the effect of individual types of news events on 
interest rate expectations. The econometric model employed in Section 4 provides 
such an estimation technique, modelling the mean and the standard deviation of the 
change in interest rate futures jointly. 
4.  Measuring the Impact of News on Interest Rates: A Cross-
country Study 
Empirical modelling of financial time-series data usually needs to take account of 
changing asset return variance, whereby periods of low and high volatility tend to 
be clustered. This phenomenon can be captured by employing models of 
conditional heteroskedasticity such as the ARCH (autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity) and GARCH (generalised ARCH) models suggested by 
Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). As mentioned above, such an approach allows 
us to deal with the different nature of the central bank communication variable 
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compared with macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises. It does so by 
simultaneously estimating the mean equation for interest rate futures and the 
variance of the residuals from the mean equation. 
The next section briefly describes the specific model estimated, using the data 
described in Section 3.1. In Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 we present the empirical 
results for the effect of different types of news: domestic macroeconomic data 
releases, foreign market movements, monetary policy surprises, and different 
channels of central bank communication. Comparing the results across different 
economies also allows us to assess the effectiveness of these channels across 
different monetary policy frameworks. 
4.1  The Econometric Model 
The econometric model underlying our analysis of interest rate futures is an 
EGARCH (exponential generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) 
model suggested by Nelson (1991). The exponential form allows for asymmetry in 
the response of interest rate futures following positive or negative shocks. It has 
the added advantage of guaranteeing that the estimated daily conditional variance 
is always positive.9 
4.1.1   The mean equation 
The mean equation for changes in 90-day bank bill futures rates, ∆ft, is specified 
for each economy as in Equation (1), but we exclude central bank communication 
events: 
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9  For an accessible exposition of ARCH and GARCH models, see McKenzie and 
Brooks (1999). 
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4.1.2  The variance equation 
To explicitly model ARCH effects, we assume that the residuals from the mean 
Equation (3) can be modelled as a function of the standard deviation of the 
residuals ht, and an independently and identically distributed term vt: 
   (4)    ) , 0 ( ~   
2
t t t t h h v = ε
vt are also known as the standardised residuals: 







=  (5) 
The variance of the residuals, h
2
t, is modelled as a function of its own past values, 
past errors from the mean equation and other factors which may be influencing the 
conditional variance.10 In our EGARCH(x,y) framework, we assume that the 
logged variance ln(h
2
t) of the residuals can be modelled as: 
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where comw,t denotes a dummy for monetary policy communication channel w.11 
ARCH in the residuals is addressed by including lags of the  absolute value 
standardised residuals |vt–x|, and lags of the logged conditional variance terms 
ln(h
2
t–y). Asymmetric responses to shocks can be addressed by including lags of the 
standardised residuals vt–x. Days to rollover for each futures contract are captured 
                                           
10 GARCH models of short rates often require the inclusion of the level of the interest rate in the 
variance equation (we would like to thank Adrian Pagan for drawing our attention to this). In 
our model we find that this term is insignificant (or negative) over almost all horizons for all 
the countries studied. One possible explanation is that this term serves to model differences in 
the magnitude of policy changes under high and low inflation, but for the period we studied 
inflation was always low. 
11 As suggested by the results in Section 3, if the communication events are included in the 
mean equation their average effect is insignificant. This result, however, may be due to the 
measurement of these variables, which does not include ‘direction’ of the information and 
therefore ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ movements may be netted out. Changes in the mean also 
affect the variance on the day of the news event, but the effect on the variance abstracts from 
the direction of the effect. Therefore, in our framework, the coefficient in the variance 
equation captures both (non-directional) changes in the mean and possible additional effects 
on the variance. 
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by the variable Other7,t. Finally, as in the mean equation, we include time-specific 
dummies. Identifying the effect of the economic commentary on days of monetary 
policy decisions is a particular challenge, since there can also be a policy rate 
surprise on these days. We attempt to do this by controlling for the surprise in the 
mean equation. Therefore, the communication dummies in the variance equation 
should only reflect effects not captured by the interest rate surprises modelled in 
the mean equation.12 
We estimate the model in Equations (3) and (6) for Australia, Canada, the euro 
area, New Zealand, the UK and the US, and for a panel of these economies, using 
fixed effects in both the mean and variance equations.13 The equations are 
estimated for each of the first eight 90-day futures contracts, which measure 
interest rate expectations from the 3-month to 2-year horizon. We first estimated 
Equation (3) for each economy with all the available explanatory variables 
using OLS to obtain a more parsimonious model by excluding insignificant 
macroeconomic releases. GARCH models are estimated by the method of 
maximum likelihood using an iterative algorithm, since the conditional variance 
appears in a non-linear way in the likelihood function. We estimated the EGARCH 
model using a general-to-specific modelling approach, by excluding insignificant 
variables in a number of iterations. Similarly, we tested the appropriate dimensions 
of the EGARCH model for each economy separately. Interestingly, the lagged 
conditional variance terms in the variance equation were insignificant, except for 
the US, thus reducing our models to an ARCH specification. Economically, this 
implies that an increase in the conditional variance of interest rate futures as a 
result of communication does not lead to increased variance on subsequent days. 
Table 5 summarises the specifications and diagnostics of the final models. The 
overall fit of the equations are reasonable, with R-squared values of between 0.14 
and 0.61.14 
                                           
12 In principle, macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises could affect both mean and 
variance. However, the inclusion of these variables in the variance equation yields mostly 
insignificant effects, suggesting that most of their effect has been absorbed by the mean 
equation. 
13 We estimated our GARCH model with EViews, version 3.1. The panel regression with 
GARCH followed the example in Grier and Cermeño (2001). 
14 A significant portion of this explanatory power comes from the ‘foreign rates’ variable, which 
helps to explain why the fit is lowest for the US. 
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Table 5: Specification and Diagnostics for EGARCH Model 
4
th contract, January 1997–June 2004 
 Australia  Canada  Euro  area NZ  UK  US  Panel 
EGARCH (x,y)  (3,0) (5,0) (4,0) (5,0)  (4,0)  (5,1) (5,0) 
Overseas 
effects 
US US US  US,  Aus  US –  US 
Diagnostics           
R
2  0.34 0.61 0.40 0.54  0.30  0.14 0.35 
ARCH  LM  (5)  {0.79} {0.81} {0.65} {0.58}  {0.92}  {0.86} {0.62} 
Excess  kurtosis  2.24 2.25 0.71 2.88  1.04  1.59 1.52 
Notes:  Numbers in braces are p-values. Estimates for the euro area and the panel start from 1 January 1999, and
for NZ from 17 March 1999. In the variance equation, x is the number of lagged standardised residuals 
and y is the number of lags of the logged conditional variance (see Equation (6)). 
 
The variance equations for each economy include an EGARCH specification 
sufficient to account for any ARCH remaining in the standardised residuals. This is 
confirmed using ARCH LM tests. While the excess kurtosis of the interest rate 
futures has been greatly reduced by the EGARCH model, there is still some 
evidence of excess kurtosis, indicating non-normality of the standardised residuals. 
Therefore, Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors are reported.15 We now turn to specific results these estimations 
yielded. For brevity, we will only show the results for the 4
th contract for interest 
rate futures in the tables, however, the figures show the results across all eight 
contracts. More detailed results can be found in Appendix B. 
4.2  The Effect of Macroeconomic News and Monetary Policy Surprises 
The results of the mean equation can tell us which macroeconomic news releases 
are most important for interest rate expectations. As mentioned above, we included 
a large number of macroeconomic surprise variables. For instance, there were 801 
Australian news releases during the period, made up of 16 different types of 
releases, of which half significantly influenced interest rate expectations. Table 6 
shows which economic releases were found to be significant in the mean equation 
for the change in interest rate futures (4
th contract). 
                                           
15 This approach, which uses quasi-maximum likelihood estimation, is standard in the literature; 
see McKenzie and Brooks (1999, p 24) and Jansen and de Haan (2003). 
  
Table 6: Economic Releases which Significantly Influence Interest Rate Expectations – Mean Equation 
              Australia Canada Euro  area NZ UK US
Prices  CPI  CPI  PPI (euro area) 
CPI (France) 
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For Australia, activity indicators such as retail sales, building approvals and GDP 
are significant along with prices and labour market indicators such as the CPI and 
employment. These results are consistent with those found by Campbell and 
Lewis (1998) and Silvapulle, Pereira and Lee (1997). While not included in 
Table 6, US data surprises – measured through their impact on US interest rate 
futures – explain a large share of movements in Australian interest rate futures. 
This result has been confirmed by earlier studies, such as Kim and Sheen (2000). 
The results for other economies are also in line with those found by previous 
country-specific studies, where available. For example, for the US, Kohn and Sack 
(2003) find that announcements of 13 economic data releases affect the Federal 
funds futures significantly; almost all of these are included in our list of 18 
significant macroeconomic releases for the US. For Canada, Gravelle and 
Moessner (2001) single out surprises in the PPI, employment and US data, 
comparable to our results. Across economies, a number of similar releases can 
consistently be found to be significant. These are not surprising: CPI in the 
category of important price releases, unemployment in the labour market category 
and GDP and retail sales in the economic activity category. 
The results for the mean equations can also show whether market participants view 
surprises in monetary policy decisions as shocks to the short-term or medium-term 
outlook. For Australia, interest rate futures which expire within three months (the 
1
st contract) respond quite strongly to monetary policy surprises, rising by around 
6 basis points in response to an unexpected cash rate increase of 10 basis points 
(Figure  1). This response falls steadily as the settlement date becomes more 
distant. This suggests that market participants view monetary policy surprises as 
containing more short-run than medium-run information. In contrast, 
macroeconomic surprises such as GDP, the CPI or retail trade have a relatively 
consistent effect on interest rate expectations out to the two-year horizon. This 
suggests that they are viewed as relevant to the medium-term outlook. This is 
consistent with the findings of Campbell and Lewis, who report that monetary 
policy news has more often been associated with a large move in bill yields (that 
is, the short end of the futures market) while macroeconomic surprises also 
affected bond yields (that is, the long end of the market). 
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic and Policy Surprises – Australia 
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Overall, the profile for the interest rate futures response to monetary policy 
surprises for Australia is reasonably representative for those of the other 
economies, with an impact of between 5 and 8 basis points on the 1
st contract, 
which steadily declines for the contracts further ahead. We do not report these 
results in more detail, since they are in line with those found by a number of other 
studies (see, for example, Kohn and Sack 2003 for the US, Gravelle and Moessner 
2001 for Canada, and Chadha and Nolan 2001 for the UK). It is worth noting, 
however, that the results for New Zealand seem to have a less smooth profile, 
possibly because of the lower liquidity of the New Zealand futures market, 
especially for the longer-dated contracts. 
4.3  The Effect of Monetary Policy Communication 
One of the motivations of our study is to estimate the effectiveness of different 
channels of central bank communication, and to analyse whether we can detect 
consistent patterns across different economies. For this, we now turn our attention 
to the results from the variance equation. As stressed earlier, due to the nature of 
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our communication variables (it is difficult to objectively measure news contained 
in communication events), we interpret a positive statistically significant result as 
‘effective’ since it appears to have provided information to the markets.16 We 
cannot, however, measure whether the information extracted by the markets is the 
information the central bank intended to convey. 
In Table 7, the communication results from the variance equation are presented for 
each economy and the panel. Some types of communication, such as publishing 
minutes of meetings, are used only by some central banks and therefore some 
values are missing from this table. Other events do not occur often (such as 
unscheduled rate moves). We would expect such events to have a significant effect 
on markets precisely because they are rare. However, estimated coefficients for 
these events should be treated with caution since they are based on very few 
observations. Any coefficient based on 10 or less events is reported in braces. 
Again, the results are presented for the 4
th futures contracts. 
Across all economies – given the size and significance of the coefficients – the 
most important channels of monetary policy communication are the economic 
commentary accompanying rate moves, parliamentary hearings and monetary 
policy reports; minutes of meetings and speeches are much less important. As 
discussed in Section 4.1, identifying the effect of the economic commentary on 
days of monetary policy decisions is a particular challenge, due to the concurrent 
policy decision. In this respect, the results in Table 7 are comforting, since policy 
decisions without commentary are insignificant for almost all conditional variance 
regressions. This suggests that the policy surprise effect is well captured by the 
mean equation, allowing us to identify the communication effect through the 
variance equation. 
                                           
16 Significant, but negative coefficients in the variance equation imply that on the day of the 
event the variance of the interest rate future is typically lower than on days without such 
events. Therefore, we are primarily interested in results when the coefficient is significantly 
positive. 
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Table 7: Effect of Central Bank Communication on 
Interest Rate Futures – Various Equations 
4
th contract, January 1997–June 2004 
 Australia  Canada Euro  area NZ  UK  US  Panel 
Commentary with rate decisions          








































Rate decisions without commentary        
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(0.23) 
























Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution. The model
for the euro area and the panel was estimated from 1 January 1999 and for NZ from 17 March 1999. The
US Fed’s monetary policy report and testimony occur simultaneously, so the same coefficient is reported
for both. 
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It is not straightforward to interpret the magnitude of the coefficients and compare 
them across economies, since the dependent variable of the variance equation is the 
logged conditional variance. To make interpretation easier, in the following figures 
we have transformed the coefficients in Table 7 such that they represent the 
average effect in basis points on the standard deviation of policy expectations for 
all horizons.17 These transformed coefficients measure the change, in basis points, 
of the standard deviation of the interest rate futures on average on the day when a 
specific communication event occurs. 
Figure 2 shows these transformed coefficients for Australia over all eight futures 
contracts (similar figures for the other economies can be found in Appendix B). 
The results indicate that parliamentary hearings have the largest impact on interest 
rate expectations among the various communication channels. On average, 
parliamentary hearings shifted the standard deviation of interest rate expectations 
by around 2 to 6 basis points, with the largest effect on expectations of rates in two 
to three quarters’ time. Other channels of communication that also have an effect 
are the quarterly Statement on Monetary Policy (reports), the commentary 
accompanying scheduled rate moves and speeches. Each of these has an average 
effect of around 1 to 4 basis points on rates, with the largest response at the two- to 
three-quarter horizon. 
The channels of communication which have the greatest effect on Australian 
interest rate expectations are also among the most important for the other central 
banks in our sample. We will discuss these specific results in more detail in the 
remainder of the section. 
                                           
17 We take the average difference between the standard deviation of the errors in our regressions 
and those that would result if we assumed (in turn) that each channel of communication did 
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Figure 2: Communication – Australia 
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4.3.1  Commentary with monetary policy decisions 
The commentary accompanying rate moves influences policy expectations 
significantly in all economies for the first year ahead (Table 7 and Figure 3), while 
‘no move’ decisions with commentary are positive and significant in the euro area, 
New Zealand and the US. In contrast, ‘no move’ decisions without commentary 
are positive and significant only for the UK, with the panel result showing 
insignificance. 
These results suggest that markets’ interest rate expectations are influenced by the 
commentary accompanying rate decisions, and not just the decision itself. This is 
consistent with the results of Kohn  and  Sack (2003) for the US, and the close 
scrutiny given to press releases and press conferences by market participants and 
the media. 
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Figure 3: Commentary with Scheduled Rate Moves 
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As noted earlier, these results cannot be used to determine whether the response of 
the markets was consistent with the intentions of the central bank. In the US in 
particular, there has been debate over whether the FOMC policy statements should 
be signalling future policy intentions. For instance, in August 2003, William Poole, 
President of the St. Louis Fed, argued that narrower language should have been 
used in the FOMC statement in May 2003 that warned of deflation, thereby 
contributing to a decline in bond rates (see Poole 2003). 
4.3.2   Monetary policy reports and parliamentary hearings 
Policy reports and post-report parliamentary hearings appear to be the most 
important channels of communication outside of rate decisions (Figures 4 and 5). 
The magnitude of response is largest in the US, Australia and New Zealand, where 
the average effect on the standard deviation of expectations is around 4–10 basis 
points. 
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Figure 4: Parliamentary Hearing 
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Parliamentary hearings in Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US significantly 
affect the markets. Notably, the US post-report hearing, the Humphrey-Hawkins 
testimony, has a much larger effect than other US testimonies. Two factors are 
likely to play a role in this: the Humphrey-Hawkins testimony coincides with the 
release of the monetary policy report – so we cannot disentangle the two effects – 
and it occurs less frequently than the other testimonies. The results for 
New Zealand are also significant, but since parliamentary hearings, monetary 
policy reports and rate decisions often happen on the same day, the magnitudes of 
individual effects are harder to disentangle. Moreover, the futures market in New 
Zealand is less liquid than in the other economies considered here, which might 
explain why most of the results for New Zealand appear less ‘smooth’ across the 
different futures contracts. 
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Figure 5: Monetary Policy Report 
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The monetary policy reports in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US 
provide information that significantly affects the markets. For the US, this effect 
also incorporates any effects of the parliamentary testimony that coincides with the 
report, which might explain the relatively large effect. The Bank of England’s 
Inflation Report did not significantly influence market expectations of future rates. 
This result is consistent with Chadha and Nolan (2001), who also found that the 
Inflation Report did not significantly influence interest rates. The ECB’s analysis 
of ‘Economic and Monetary Developments’ is also insignificant. The ECB’s report 
is published more frequently, as part of the monthly Bulletin, while most other 
central banks’ reports are published on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. The high 
frequency of these reports might be one reason why the effect of an individual 
monetary policy report for the euro area is relatively small. 
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4.3.3   Minutes of meetings and voting records 
Only two economies in our sample (the UK and the US) release minutes of their 
monetary policy committee meetings (and voting records). Only the coefficient for 
the UK is significant, while that for the US is insignificant and close to zero for all 
futures contracts. The UK minutes are significant at all horizons, in contrast with 
the results by Chadha and Nolan (2001) who find an insignificant effect for the 
UK. Given that the UK minutes are released monthly, two weeks after policy 
decisions, this may help to explain why the Bank of England’s quarterly Inflation 
Report has little effect on expectations. 
There are several explanations for the relative unimportance of the US minutes. 
First, the minutes are released with a lag of 6–8 weeks by the Fed on the day after 
the following FOMC meeting, which reduces their relevance for forward-looking 
analysis. It is also unclear whether the Fed is intending to influence expectations 
with the minutes. In 1997, the FOMC was concerned that the minutes were not 
receiving enough press, and shifted the timing of the release to try to maximise 
reporting in the Friday papers.The associated debate regarding the target audience 
of the minutes – whether it is the media, the markets or Congress – suggests that 
the FOMC was more concerned about how the minutes were viewed by the press 
and Congress than whether they are a tool to influence markets’ expectations 
(see FOMC 1997). 
These results highlight another aspect of our study. ‘Having’ a certain channel of 
communication is not necessarily the decisive factor. Markets will attach 
importance to a specific channel only if new information is conveyed. However, 
the same information can, in principle, be conveyed through other communication 
events. Consequently, the difference in results for specific communication 
channels across economies can often be explained by looking at the entire 
communication structure. For instance, minutes for the UK are released two weeks 
after the meeting, and are therefore likely to be one of the first communication 
events that convey the views of the central bank after a meeting of the Monetary 
Policy Committee. In contrast, the minutes of the Federal Reserve are not released 
until after the next meeting has taken place. In the meantime, a number of different 
communication events will have happened which allows the central bank to 
explain its views on current conditions for monetary policy. 
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4.3.4  Speeches 
While we find that speeches have a significant positive coefficient for Australia 
and – at an 80 per cent significance level – also for the US, this effect is not 
systematic across all the central banks in our sample. One explanation could be 
that speeches occur relatively frequently and, therefore, information tends to be 
conveyed more gradually. However, this result may also be a reflection of our 
methodology, rather than a general statement on whether speeches are used to 
convey important information in these other economies. We do not subjectively 
choose speeches that are more likely to influence expectations. Instead, all 
speeches published on the websites of the central banks are included in our sample. 
Some of these may be speaking engagements dealing with other central bank 
responsibilities unrelated to monetary policy. For the economies with an 
insignificant overall effect, the inclusion of these speeches is likely to hide the 
effect of speeches that are deliberately designed to influence expectations.18 Even 
if we were able to single out these speeches, we would still be left with the 
problem that in some instances information may be conveyed during a question 
and answer session following a speech. 
4.3.5  Panel results 
Our panel, which estimates the effect across all central banks, can provide some 
insights into the common factors of the communication strategies of the six central 
banks (Figure 6). The results suggest that across the six economies, central banks 
have used parliamentary hearings, commentaries with policy decisions and 
monetary policy reports to influence interest rate expectations. These channels of 
communication affect the outlook for policy in both the short and medium term. 
Minutes of meetings are significant, but are entirely driven by the results for the 
UK, while speeches do not have a significant effect. 
                                           
18 Some evidence that this factor plays a role is provided by a robustness test where we decided 
whether a speech dealt with monetary policy based on its title. Using this split in our 
regressions, we find that speeches in the ‘Monetary policy’ category are significant for the 
euro area, the US and – for horizons up to one year – New Zealand, while those in the ‘Other’ 
category tend to be insignificant. 
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Figure 6: Communication – Panel of Central Banks 
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5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed the effect of news relating to the expected path of 
monetary policy on interest rate futures. We consider four types of news: domestic 
macroeconomic news, foreign news, monetary policy surprises and central bank 
communication. The effect of these types of news on daily changes in interest rate 
futures was estimated using an EGARCH model for a panel of economies. We find 
that interest rate expectations respond to both macroeconomic (domestic and 
foreign) and policy news, although the response to macroeconomic news is larger, 
especially once we include foreign news. Overall, the results suggest that the 
impact of the RBA’s communication policy is in line with other major central 
banks, and significantly influences (and informs) expectations of future monetary 
policy. 
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Previous work has found that the predictability of monetary policy is very similar 
for major central banks including the RBA, despite differences in the 
communication frameworks (see Coppel and Connolly 2003). This implies that 
central banks provide information on the future path of monetary policy to a very 
similar extent. Our study could shed light on some factors underlying this 
similarity. 
The channels of communication that are found to most influence expectations – 
commentary with rate decisions, monetary policy reports and parliamentary 
hearings – tend to be used by all the central banks in our study. Interestingly, 
communication events that occur more frequently tend to have less effect on 
expectations of future policy. However, this is consistent with the view that more 
frequent channels allow the central bank to convey information gradually, at the 
same time as it learns about changes in current and expected future conditions for 
monetary policy. 
The individual economy results reflect small differences in the structures of central 
bank communication policies. Some channels, such as minutes of meetings, have 
significant effects in some economies but not in others. However, these results do 
not imply that some central banks convey ‘more’ information than others. They 
merely suggest that central banks can use different channels to convey the same 
information. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Interest rates and interest rate futures: Table A1 below lists for each of the six 
economies the source of the eight 90-day interest rate futures, the policy rate and 
the 30-day interest rate future. The latter two variables are used to construct the 
variable that measures the surprise element of an interest rate decision, as 
discussed in the main text. 
Table A1: Interest Rate Data and Sources 
 90-day  futures
(a) Policy  rate  1-month
(b) 
Australia  Bank bills: IR1–IR8  Cash rate: Reserve Bank of 
Australia Bulletin Table A.2 
Bank bills: Reserve Bank of 
Australia Bulletin Table F.1 
Canada Bankers  acceptances: 
BA1–BA8 
Target rate: Bank of Canada Bankers  acceptances: 
Bank of Canada 
Euro area  EurIBOR: ER1–ER8  Repo rate: European Central 
Bank 
FIBOR:
(c) FIBOR1M and 
GERMDRM pre-January 1999
NZ  Bank bills: ZB1–ZB8  Cash rate: Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand 
Bank bills: Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand 
UK  LIBOR: L1–L8  Base rates: Bank of England  LIBOR
(c): UKC0L01
(b) 





Notes:   (a) Codes from Bloomberg. 
(b) Codes from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
(c) The response to policy moves is lagged one day since policy moves are announced after the market 
rate is measured. 
 
Macroeconomic news surprises: Data for the macroeconomic news surprises (the 
difference between expected and actual outcomes of macroeconomic news 
releases) were obtained from Bloomberg’s Economic Calendar. We included all 
releases that were available for the sample period. Those releases that were found 
to have a significant effect on interest rate expectations can be found in Table 6 in 
the main text. The detailed results (coefficients and significance levels) of the 
GARCH model and a list of all the releases included are available on request from 
the authors. 
Central bank communication events: Dates and events were obtained from the 
websites of the respective central banks. The list of parliamentary committee 
hearings for the United Kingdom was obtained from the website of the House of 
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Commons Treasury Select Committee and for New Zealand from the website of 
the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee of the New Zealand House of 
Representatives. 
•  Commentaries following rate decisions were identified according to whether a 
transcript of a press conference or a press release with details was recorded on 
the website of a central bank. 
•  The parliamentary hearings included: for Australia, the half-yearly 
parliamentary hearings before the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration; for Canada, 
the governor’s appearances before the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Finance and on Banking, Trade and Commerce; for the euro 
area, the annual report to the European Parliament and the testimonies before 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy, and the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on 
Monetary Affairs; for New Zealand, the governor’s parliamentary 
testimonies; for the United Kingdom, the oral evidence by MPC members 
before the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee; and for the US, 
the chairman’s Humphrey-Hawkins testimony to Congress, and – included in 
‘other testimonies’ – the chairman’s testimonies before the Committee on the 
Budget (US Senate and House of Representatives) and before the Joint 
Economic Committee of the US Congress, consistent with Kohn and 
Sack (2003). 
•  The monetary policy reports include: for Australia, the quarterly Statement on 
Monetary Policy; for Canada, the 6-monthly Monetary Policy Report and the 
quarterly update; for the euro area, the European Central Bank’s analysis of 
‘Economic and Monetary Developments’ included in the monthly Bulletin; 
for New Zealand, the quarterly Monetary Policy Statement; for the United 
Kingdom, the quarterly Inflation Report; and for the US, the Humphrey-
Hawkins semi-annual monetary policy report. 
•  We included all speeches by senior central bank officials listed on the central 
banks’ websites. 
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Appendix B: Econometric Results 
Lag specifications 
Equations (3) and (6) (they are repeated below for convenience) specify the 
GARCH model for each economy and each futures contract. In order to determine 
the number of lags, the model for the 4
th futures contract was estimated in a general 
specification and insignificant lags excluded. In order to allow for comparability, 
the same reduced model was estimated for the other contracts and for the models in 
Equations (1) and (2).19 
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Table B1 summarises the resulting lag structure for the models of each economy. 
Table B1: Lag Specifications for EGARCH Models 
4
th contract, January 1997–June 2004 
 Australia  Canada  Euro  area NZ  UK  US  Panel 
Mean equation         
Lags of dependent 
variable (j) 
1 0 5 3 3 3 0 
Lags of overseas futures 
(m) 
1 1 3 3 3 – 1 
Variance equation         
Lags of standardised 
residual (n) 
3 5 4 5 4 5 5 
Lags of logged 
conditional variance (p)
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
                                           
19 The model specification for the panel of economies allows for a different constant for each 
economy, while all other variables are pooled. 
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Results for the mean equation 
We included in the mean equation all the macroeconomic data releases for each 
economy for which we could obtain matching data on markets’ expectations from 
Bloomberg. We then reduced this model by excluding those releases that were 
found to have no effect for the 4
th contract. In order to maintain comparability 
across the different futures contracts, we then used the same model for all 
contracts. The selected models would have been broadly the same if we had 
applied the reduction methodology for each futures contract separately. 
A list of all the data releases included initially and the detailed econometric results 
for the mean equation are available on request from the authors. 
Results for the variance equation 
In this section we present details of the estimation results for the variance equation. 
For each economy, we present the results from the EGARCH estimation for all 
eight futures contracts. We also present the graphical illustration of these results 
using the transformation discussed in the main text on page  25, except for the 
Australian results and the panel results, which are illustrated in Figures 2 and 6. 
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Table B2: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for Australia 
January 1997–June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution.  
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Table B3: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for Canada 
January 1997–June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution.  
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Table B4: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for the Euro Area 
January 1999–June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution.  
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Table B5: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for New Zealand 
March 1999–June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution. The model
for the euro area and the panel was estimated from 1 January 1999 and for NZ from 17 March 1999. The 
US Fed’s monetary policy report and testimony occur simultaneously, so the same coefficient is reported
for both. 
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Table B6: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for the United Kingdom 
January 1997–June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution.  
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Table B7: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for the United States 
January 1997–June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution. The
US Fed’s monetary policy report and testimony occur simultaneously, so the same coefficient is reported
for both. 
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Table B8: Effect of Central Bank Communication on Interest Rate Futures 
Variance Equation for the Panel 
January 1999 –June 2004 
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Notes:  Numbers in brackets are Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
***, **, * indicate positive coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
Estimates in braces are based on 10 or less events and should therefore be treated with caution. The
US Fed’s monetary policy report and testimony occur simultaneously, so the same coefficient is reported
for both. 
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Figure B1: Communication – Canada 
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Figure B2: Communication – Euro Area 
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Figure B3: Communication – New Zealand 
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Figure B4: Communication – United Kingdom 
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Figure B5: Communication – United States 
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